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Abstract 
Situation selection involves choosing situations based on their likely emotional impact 
and may be less cognitively taxing or challenging to implement compared to other strategies for 
regulating emotion, which require people to regulate their emotions ‘in the moment’. We thus 
predicted that individuals who chronically experience intense emotions or who are not 
particularly competent at employing other emotion regulation strategies would be especially 
likely to benefit from situation selection. Consistent with this idea, we found that the use of 
situation selection interacted with individual differences in emotional reactivity and competence 
at emotion regulation to predict emotional outcomes in both a correlational (Study 1; N = 301) 
and an experimental field study (Study 2; N = 125). Taken together, the findings suggest that 
situation selection is an effective strategy for regulating emotions, especially for individuals who 
otherwise struggle to do so. 
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Situation Selection is a Particularly Effective Emotion Regulation Strategy for People Who Need 
Help Regulating Their Emotions 
People often regulate their emotions: They try to stifle anger at their boss, hold back 
laughter during serious meetings, and try to feel more upbeat on gray days. Decades of research 
have examined the strategies that most effectively regulate emotions (see Webb, Miles, & 
Sheeran, 2012, for a review), often highlighting cognitive strategies that require individuals to 
change their interpretation or focus on the situation that they are in. Indeed, research shows that 
reappraisal (i.e., thinking differently about an emotional situation; Gross, 1998a), distancing (i.e., 
imagining oneself as not involved in an emotional situation; Kross & Ayduk, 2011), and 
distraction (i.e., shifting attention away from emotionally evocative information; van Dillen & 
Koole, 2007) are particularly useful strategies for altering emotional experiences (Webb et al., 
2012).  
However, these strategies draw on cognitive resources (Hofmann, Schmeichel, & 
Baddeley, 2012) that are not always available (Vohs & Heatherton, 2000). Moreover, these 
strategies may not be helpful in certain contexts or for certain individuals, for other reasons. For 
instance, although reappraisal is often considered to be one of the most effective strategies for 
regulating emotions (Webb et al., 2012), evidence also suggests that reappraisal is less effective 
when emotions are very intense (Sheppes & Gross, 2011). This may explain why people 
typically refrain from using reappraisal in highly emotional situations (Sheppes, Scheibe, Suri, & 
Gross, 2011; Sheppes, Scheibe, Suri, Radu, Blechert, & Gross, 2012). People may be less likely 
use reappraisal in these contexts because it is difficult to change the interpretation of very strong 
feelings or the circumstances that created them. Reappraisal may also be particularly difficult for 
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individuals who believe that they are poor at emotion regulation because they lack the motivation 
or self-efficacy to attempt to reappraise.  
As cognitive strategies may not work for all individuals in all contexts (Aldao, Sheppes, 
& Gross, 2015; Bonanno & Burton, 2013; Kashdan & Rottenberg, 2010), we predicted that 
situation selection – an emotion regulation strategy that involves choosing situations based on 
their likely emotional impact – would be an especially useful strategy for individuals who 
frequently experience highly intense emotions and / or are poor at regulating their emotions in 
the moment. For these individuals, knowing which situations to choose and which to avoid in 
order to circumvent intense, difficult to control affective states is likely to be particularly 
advantageous. If so, then this finding would point to a different way to help people to regulate 
their emotions – by prompting them to be aware of the likely affective consequences of different 
situations and to select which to engage with accordingly. The present research, therefore, 
investigates the effect of situation selection on the emotional experiences of individuals who 
typically experience intense emotions (i.e., are high in affective reactivity) and those who believe 
that they are poor at emotion regulation (i.e., are low in emotion regulation competence). 
Situation Selection and the Process Model of Emotion Regulation 
Situation selection is a forward-looking, proactive strategy that requires people to 
anticipate how a situation might make them feel before deciding whether to approach or avoid 
that situation (Gross, 2015). It encompasses notions of behavioral activation (i.e., approaching 
situations that might prove rewarding, Gray, 1987), but is broader in that it can also involve 
avoiding situations that might evoke unwanted emotions. According to the process model of 
emotion regulation (Gross, 1998a, 1998b; 2015; Gross & Thompson, 2007), situation selection is 
an antecedent-focused regulation strategy that is instigated before affective responses occur 
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(Gross, 2015). Once a person is in an emotional situation, however, s/he has to either try to 
modify aspects of that situation to achieve the desired emotional outcome (termed ‘situation 
modification’) or rely on strategies such as attentional deployment (e.g., distraction), cognitive 
change (e.g., reappraisal, distancing) or suppression, to regulate feelings as they unfold (Gross, 
2015). Although some of the latter strategies have been shown to be effective (Webb et al., 
2012), they are limited in that they can only be instigated once a person is already in an 
emotional situation.  
There is growing evidence that situation selection is an effective way to regulate feelings 
(see Duckworth, Gendler, & Gross, 2016). Individuals select situations in an effort to change 
their mood (Erber, Wegner, & Therriault, 1996; Parkinson & Totterdell, 1999; Thayer, Newman, 
& McClain, 1994) and strategically use situations in an effort to evoke emotions that they believe 
will serve their goals (see Duckworth et al. 2016; Tamir, 2016). For instance, participants 
expecting to play a confrontational video game (Tamir, Mitchell, & Gross, 2008) or take part in a 
negotiation (Tamir & Ford, 2012) were more likely to choose to listen to music that they 
believed would make them feel angry than choose exciting or neutral music. Similarly, 
participants who expected to play a video game that involved avoiding predators were more 
likely to choose to engage in activities likely to provoke fear (e.g., recalling memories of fearful 
experiences, listening to fear-inducing music) than activities likely to make them feel excited 
(Tamir & Ford, 2009).  
Situation selection also emerges as a particularly useful emotion regulation strategy 
across the lifespan (for reviews, see Sims, Hogan, & Carstensen, 2015; Urry & Gross, 2010). For 
example, older adults are more likely than younger adults to be selective about who they 
socialize with (Carstensen, Gross, & Fung, 1997), perhaps because they are better able to predict 
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the emotional consequences of these social interactions (Nielsen, Knutson, & Carstensen, 2008; 
Scheibe, Mata, & Carstensen, 2011; Urry & Gross, 2010). Older adults also seem to be more 
selective than younger adults about the types of information that they choose to engage with. For 
example, unless directed to reduce negative emotions, younger adults tend to engage with 
negative videos, articles, and slideshows. In contrast, older adults avoid looking at such negative 
information whether given the goal to minimize their negative affect or to simply to look at what 
they find most interesting (Livingstone & Isaacowitz, 2015). These findings suggest that older 
adults may have learned to chronically adopt situation selection strategies, whereas younger 
adults only use them when they explicitly intend to reduce their negative feelings.  
Findings from clinical domains are also consistent with the potential benefits of situation 
selection. Aspinwall and Taylor (1997) describe proactive coping strategies that involve, in part, 
efforts to prevent potentially stressful events from occurring. Like situation selection, proactive 
coping requires that the person appraise the likely psychological impact of a situation (e.g., 
should I be worried about this?) and then make efforts to minimize the potential stressor (e.g., 
planning or seeking information from others). Proactive coping can also involve simply avoiding 
an anticipated stressful situation. For example, Mrazek and Mrazek (1987) argued that children 
who appear resilient in the face of abuse may be less affected by negative situations because they 
have acquired knowledge about the situations that are likely to trigger their tormentor, are 
vigilant for signs of danger, and are quick to avoid escalating situations.  
Of course, at the extreme, some forms of situation selection can be maladaptive. People 
with social anxiety avoid situations in which they are likely to feel anxious (Salkovskis, 1991) 
and leave situations that start to make them feel anxious (Rachman, Crask, Tallman, & Solyom, 
1984). Such ‘safety behaviors’ (Salkovskis, 1996; Wells, Salksovskis, Ludgate, Hackmann, & 
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Gelder, 1995) can prevent reality testing, especially if such behaviours hinder engagement with 
the stimulus or experience (Helbig-Lang & Petermann, 2010; Goetz, Davine, Siwiec, & Lee, 
2016). However, many forms of therapy specifically employ situation selection by exposing 
people to the situations that are otherwise avoided (e.g., using virtual reality, Powers & 
Emmelkamp, 2008). Indeed, the goal of various forms of therapy is to encourage individuals 
with psychopathology to select situations that will alter their emotions. Cognitive-behavioral 
treatments for social anxiety involve encouraging individuals to test their assumptions by putting 
themselves in situations that make them anxious (Helbig-Lang & Petermann, 2010; Goetz, 
Davine, Siwiec, & Lee, 2016). Similarly, therapeutic interventions for depression often increase 
the extent to which people engage in positive activities that they are otherwise not likely to do 
(e.g., Jacobson, Martell, & Dimidjian, 2001).  
For Whom Might Situation Selection Be Most Useful? 
In the present research we hypothesize that avoiding situations that have negative 
affective consequences and approaching situations that have positive affective consequences may 
be especially beneficial for people who (a) have a tendency to experience strong emotions and / 
or (b) are not adept at dealing with emotions as and when they arise. Individuals differ in the 
quality and intensity of their reactions to emotionally evocative stimuli – for some individuals, 
emotional highs are extremely high and lows are extremely low. These individuals are said to be 
high in affective reactivity1 (Aronson, Barrett, & Quigley, 2006; Gross, 1998c; Nock, Wedig, 
Holmberg, & Hooley, 2008; Wheeler, Davidson, & Tomarken, 1993). Given that people who are 
reactive may experience emotions (a) in response to a wide array of stimuli, (b) strongly or 
																																																								
1	Hereafter, we refer to this construct merely as ‘reactivity’. Reactivity encompasses the idea of affect intensity (i.e., 
stable individual differences in the magnitude of emotional responses, Larsen & Diener, 1987), but also reflects 
individual differences in peoples’ sensitivity to emotions and the duration of emotional responses (Nock et al., 
2008).	
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intensely, and (c) for a prolonged period of time (Nock et al., 2008), they may derive particular 
benefit from emotion regulation strategies, such as situation selection, that effectively preempt 
the unfolding of unwanted emotions, rather than attempting to regulate highly intense emotions 
as and when they arise.  
People also differ in their competence at regulating emotions once they occur. 
Competence at regulating emotions is a subcomponent of emotional intelligence (Brasseur, 
Grégoire, Bourdu, & Mikolajczak, 2013; Mayer & Salovey, 1995; Scherer, 2007). Evidence 
suggests that people who are poor at emotion regulation find controlling their emotions depleting 
and effortful (Niven, Totterdell, Miles, Webb, & Sheeran, 2013). Using strategies that do not 
require regulation in the moment may thus be especially helpful for people who consider 
themselves to be poor at emotion regulation (also see Urry & Gross, 2010). Consistent with this 
idea, Rovenpor, Skogsberg, and Isaacowitz (2013) observed that young adults who felt less able 
to control their emotions chose to avoid viewing negative materials more so than those who felt 
better able to manage their emotions.  
The Present Research 
The present research evaluates the effects of situation selection relative to other 
frequently studied emotion regulation strategies (e.g., reappraisal, suppression) on emotional 
outcomes, and tests the moderating roles of reactivity and emotional competence. Our hypothesis 
is that situation selection will be a particularly effective strategy for regulating emotions among 
individuals who are reactive and / or poor at emotion regulation.  
Study 1 measured participants’ use of emotion regulation strategies and emotional 
experiences in daily life. To do so, we developed a new self-report measure of the extent to 
which people select situations based on their likely emotional outcomes and examined the 
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reliability and discriminant validity of the measure. We then investigated the relation between 
situation selection and a range of positive and negative emotional outcomes. Study 1 also 
provided an initial test of the idea that the impact of situation selection on outcomes might be 
moderated by reactivity and competence at emotion regulation. 
Study 2 manipulated situation selection in a naturalistic context by asking participants to 
think ahead to the weekend and adopt the goal to select activities that they believed would make 
them feel good while avoiding doing things that they believed would make them feel bad. We 
then compared the emotional experiences of participants who engaged in situation selection with 
those of participants in a control condition who were not asked to adopt the goal to select 
situations based on their likely emotional outcomes. As in Study 1, we also measured 
participants’ reactivity and competence at emotion regulation and investigated whether each 
moderated the impact of situation selection on emotional outcomes.  
Study 1  
Participants were asked to complete an online questionnaire that measured their use of 
three different emotion regulation strategies (situation selection, reappraisal, and suppression) 
and a range of emotional outcomes (subjective well-being, happiness, positive and negative 
affect, and levels of depression and anxiety). In addition, we measured reactivity and how 
competent people generally are at regulating their emotions. We predicted that, as in published 
research (see Webb et al., 2012, for a review), the use of reappraisal would be associated with 
positive emotional outcomes, while the use of suppression would be associated with less positive 
outcomes. We also expected that selecting situations based on their likely impact on emotions 
would be associated with positive emotional outcomes. Our primary hypotheses, however, was 
that situation selection would be a particularly effective strategy for regulating emotions for 
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individuals who are reactive and / or who believe that they are not good at regulating their 
emotions. 
Methods 
Participants and Procedure 
Computations via G*Power using an alpha level of .05 (two-tailed), 90% power to detect 
an effect, and 7 predictors in a linear multiple regression model indicated that 190 participants 
would be required to detect a small effect size (R2 = 0.01). N = 329 participants were therefore 
recruited via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk and were each paid $0.60 for completing an online 
questionnaire. Twenty-eight participants were excluded because they completed less than 90% of 
the measures, leaving N = 301 participants for analyses. Participants were aged between 18 and 
75 years (M = 36.22, SD = 12.63) and most were female (62.9%), held a university degree 
(59.8%), and identified themselves as white/Caucasian (76.9%). 
Measures 
Use of situation selection. We designed six statements to measure the extent to which 
participants select situations in order to regulate their emotional experiences: (i) I select activities 
that help me to feel good, (ii) If a situation makes me feel good, then I try to stick around, (iii) I 
gravitate towards people, situations, and activities that put me in a good mood, (iv) I keep doing 
something if it seems to be improving my mood, (v) I shy away from situations that might upset 
me, and (vi) I steer clear of people who put me in a bad mood. Participants were asked to 
indicate the extent to which each statement reflected them on 5-point scale from not at all like 
me to very much like me.  
Factor analysis was used to investigate the conceptual structure of the measure of 
situation selection. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy (0.84), and Bartlett’s 
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test of sphericity (647.91, df = 15, p < .001) indicated that the correlation matrix was appropriate 
for factor analysis (Dziuban & Shirkey, 1974; Kaiser & Rice, 1974). Kaiser’s (1958) criterion 
supported a single factor solution (eigenvalue = 3.67) that explained 54.55% of the variance in 
participants’ responses. The six items that comprised this factor were internally consistent (α = 
0.82) and responses were averaged to provide a measure of the extent to which people select 
situations and activities in an effort to regulate their emotions. 
Use of reappraisal and suppression. We assessed use of reappraisal and suppression 
using 10 items from the Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ; Gross & John, 2003). 
Participants were asked to indicate the extent to which they agreed with 6 statements reflecting 
the use of reappraisal (e.g., I control my emotions by changing the way I think about the situation 
I’m in) and 4 statements reflecting the use of suppression (e.g., I control my emotions by not 
expressing them) on a 7-point scale anchored by strongly disagree and strongly agree. The two 
subscales were internally reliable (reappraisal: α = 0.88, suppression: α = 0.81) and responses 
were averaged. 
Subjective well-being. We used the Satisfaction with Life Scale (SWLS; Diener, 
Emmons, Larsen, & Griffin, 1985) to assess subjective well-being. Participants were asked to 
indicate the extent to which they agreed with 5 statements (e.g., In most ways my life is close to 
my ideal) on a 7-point scale anchored by strongly disagree and strongly agree. Responses were 
internally consistent (α = 0.91) and were summed, such that high scores reflected greater 
satisfaction with life. 
Happiness. We assessed happiness using Warr, Cook, and Wall’s (1979) single-item 
measure: Taking all things together, how would you say things were these days? Would you say 
you were: 1 = not too happy, 2 = fairly happy, 3 = very happy? 
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Levels of positive and negative affect. We measured levels of positive and negative 
affect using the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 
1988). Participants were presented with 20 adjectives describing different emotions (e.g., 
excited, distressed, upset, guilty) and asked to indicate the extent to which they felt each emotion 
yesterday2 on a 5-point scale anchored by very slightly or not at all and extremely. The extent to 
which each participant experienced positive and negative emotions was then computed by 
averaging responses to positive and negative emotional adjectives (α = 0.92 for both subscales). 
Levels of anxiety and depression. We used the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale 
(HADS; Zigmond & Snaith, 1983) to assess levels of anxiety and depression. The HADS 
contains 14 statements, half of which reflect anxiety (e.g., Worrying thoughts go through my 
mind) and half of which reflect depression (e.g., I feel as if I am slowed down). Participants were 
asked to choose the response that currently described their feelings. Scores for each subscale 
were computed in accordance with the recommendations of Zigmond and Snaith (1983) and both 
scales proved to be internally consistent (α = 0.85 in both cases). 
Competence at emotion regulation. To measure competence at emotion regulation, we 
used the 3-item scale developed and validated by Niven et al. (2013): (i) How successful are you 
at controlling your emotions? (ii) How difficult do you find it to keep your feelings in check? 
And (iii) How good are you at keeping your feelings under control? Participants were asked to 
indicate the extent to which each of the statements was generally true of them on a 7-point scale 
anchored by not at all and very. The items proved internally reliable (α = 0.79). 
																																																								
2	We asked participants to focus on the day before to ensure that participants reported on a full day’s worth of 
emotions. We chose not to focus on the present day’s emotions since this was an online study and participants could 
have responded at any time of the day, possibly before experiencing many emotions (e.g., if responding very early in 
the morning). 
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Reactivity. We measured reactivity using the Emotion Reactivity Scale (ERS; Nock et 
al., 2008). The scale contains 21 statements reflecting the extent to which people experience 
emotions in response to a wide array of stimuli (e.g., Other people tell me I’m overreacting), 
strongly or intensely (e.g., I experience emotions very strongly), and for a prolonged period of 
time (e.g., When something happens that upsets me, it's all I can think about for a long time). 
Participants were asked to indicate the extent to which each statement described them on a 5-
point scale anchored by not at all like me and completely like me. The items proved internally 
reliable (α = 0.96) and an overall score was computed by taking a sum of the items.3  
Results 
Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics and correlations among the study variables. The 
use of situation selection had small-sized, but significant correlations with all of the emotional 
outcomes (-0.20 < r < 0.16), except anxiety (r = -0.03). The use of situation selection was 
significantly correlated with the use of reappraisal (r = 0.37), competence at emotion regulation 
(r = 0.14), but not with suppression (r = -0.05) or reactivity (r = 0.08). Reactivity and perceived 
competence at emotion regulation were correlated with use of reappraisal (rs = -0.26 and 0.40, 
respectively), but not suppression (rs = 0.06 and 0.02, respectively). Reactivity was negatively 
correlated with competence at emotion regulation (r = -0.62), suggesting some overlap between 
the measures, but also that they are sufficiently distinct to be treated as separate constructs in 
subsequent analyses – a conclusion that is supported by extant theorizing on the constructs (e.g., 
Brasseur et al., 2013; Nock et al., 2008). 
																																																								
3 Participants also completed the Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale (DERS; Gratz & Roemer, 2004) and the 
COPE Inventory (Carver, Scheier, & Weintraub, 1989). The questions were presented in a random order, both 
within and between measures, with the exception of the ERQ because the first and third items define positive and 
negative emotion, respectively (i.e., “When I want to feel more positive emotion (such as joy or amusement), I 
change what I’m thinking about and When I want to feel less negative emotion (such as sadness or anger), I change 
what I’m thinking about”). 
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A series of hierarchical regressions were used to investigate (a) whether the use of 
situation selection was associated with emotional outcomes and (b) whether these associations 
were particularly strong among participants who are reactive and / or poor at emotion regulation. 
Each emotional outcome (subjective well-being, happiness, positive and negative affect, anxiety, 
and depression) was regressed on the use of the three focal emotion regulation strategies (i.e., 
situation selection, reappraisal, and suppression) in Step 1 and the interactions between use of the 
regulation strategies and either reactivity or competence at emotion regulation in Step 2. The 
results of these analyses are reported in Tables 2 and 3. Predictor variables were standardized 
prior to analysis and significant interactions were plotted using simple slopes (Aiken & West, 
1991) (see Figures 1 and 2). 
Association Between the Use of Situation Selection and Emotional Outcomes 
The use of situation selection was directly associated with lower levels of negative affect 
and depression, but not the other emotional outcomes (see Table 3). As predicted, the interaction 
between the use of situation selection and reactivity was significantly associated with almost all 
emotional outcomes, including satisfaction with life, happiness, negative affect, depression and 
anxiety. Simple slopes (see Figure 1) revealed that, for reactive participants (1SD above the 
mean), the use of situation selection was associated with greater satisfaction with life (B = 2.19, 
p < .001), higher levels of happiness (B = 0.17, p < .001) and lower levels of negative affect (B = 
-2.56, p < .001), depression (B = -1.54, p < .001), and anxiety (B = -0.89, p < .001). For less 
reactive participants (1SD below the mean), on the other hand, situation selection was not related 
to these outcomes (Bs = 0.01, 0.03, -0.69, -0.49, and 0.26, ps = .989, .544, .192, .098, and .359, 
respectively).  
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As predicted, the interaction between the use of situation selection and competence at 
emotion regulation was also significantly associated with multiple emotional outcomes including 
satisfaction with life, happiness, negative affect, and depression (the effects on positive affect 
were also marginally significant, p = .06). Simple slopes (see Figure 2) revealed that, for 
participants who were not competent at regulating their emotions (1SD below the mean), 
situation selection was associated with greater satisfaction with life (B = 1.65, p < .01), higher 
levels of happiness (B = 0.11, p < .05), and lower levels of negative affect (B = -1.72, p < .01) 
and depression (B = -1.21, p < .001). For participants who were competent at regulating their 
emotions (1SD above the mean), on the other hand, situation selection was not related to these 
outcomes (Bs = -0.42, -0.01, -0.26, and -0.01, ps = .486, .838, .637, and .986, respectively).  
Association between the Use of Reappraisal and Suppression and Emotional Outcomes 
As in previous research, the use of reappraisal tended to be associated with positive 
emotional outcomes, including higher levels of happiness and positive affect, and lower levels of 
negative affect and anxiety. However, the use of reappraisal was not associated with subjective 
well-being or depression, nor did the use of reappraisal interact with either reactivity or 
competence at emotion regulation to predict emotional outcomes. Also consistent with previous 
research, suppression tended to be associated with negative emotional outcomes, including lower 
levels of happiness and positive affect, and higher levels of negative affect, depression, and 
anxiety. For the most part, suppression did not interact with either reactivity or competence at 
emotion regulation to predict emotional outcomes, although the interaction between suppression 
and reactivity was significantly associated with levels of depression. Simple slopes revealed that 
the use of suppression was more strongly related to depression among participants who were 
more reactive (1SD above the mean, B = 1.39, p < .01) than among those who were less reactive 
Running head: SITUATION SELECTION 16 
(1SD below the mean, B = 0.48, p = .095). The interaction between suppression and competence 
at emotion regulation was significantly associated with levels of negative affect, such that the use 
of suppression was more strongly related to negative affect among participants who were not 
good at regulating their emotions (1SD below the mean, B = 2.20, p < .001) than among those 
who were better (1SD above the mean, B = 0.56, p = .263). 
Discussion 
Study 1 found that the use of situation selection was associated with lower levels of 
negative affect and depression, but there was less consistent evidence that the use of situation 
selection was directly associated with positive outcomes such as increased satisfaction with life, 
happiness or positive affect (the use of situation selection was correlated with these outcomes, 
but was not directly predictive of the outcomes in multiple regressions when entered alongside 
reactivity, competence, and the other regulation strategies). It may be that measures specifically 
concerned with how people seek to promote positive affect (e.g., by prioritizing positive events; 
Catalino, Algoe, & Fredrickson, 2014) better predict such outcomes. As predicted, however, we 
found that situation selection was more strongly associated with emotional outcomes such as 
satisfaction with life, happiness, negative affect, anxiety, and depression among participants (a) 
with high levels of reactivity and (b) who do not consider themselves to be competent at emotion 
regulation. Although preliminary, these findings suggest that situation selection is an effective 
way to regulate emotions, especially for those who most need to be able to do so (i.e., people 
who experience strong, long-lasting emotions that they struggle to control). Indeed, previous 
research suggests that appropriately selecting which emotional situations to engage in is related 
to greater emotional intelligence (Ford & Tamir, 2012), psychological health, and well-being 
(Kim, Ford, Mauss, & Tamir, 2014; Tamir & Ford, 2012).  
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As in prior work, we found that reappraisal had a positive effect on emotional outcomes, 
while suppression had a negative effect (see Webb et al., 2012, for a review). The finding that 
reappraisal had a positive effect regardless of participants’ level of reactivity and competence at 
regulation warrants comment. Prior work suggests that people may avoid reappraisal in highly 
evocative emotional situations (Sheppes, et al. 2011) and our bivariate correlations suggest that 
relatively reactive participants were less likely to use reappraisal. However, the finding that the 
impact of reappraisal on emotional outcomes was not moderated by reactivity or emotion 
regulation competence suggests that it is an effective strategy even when individuals who are 
highly reactive or not competent at regulating their emotions choose to use it. An interesting 
avenue for future research would be to understand when highly reactive individuals and / or 
those who are low at regulation competence choose to employ this strategy over others. 
Study 2 
Study 1 provided one of the first tests of the moderating role of reactivity and 
competence at emotion regulation on the relationship between situation selection and affective 
outcomes. However, the test was correlational and cross-sectional. Study 2, therefore, sought to 
provide an experimental and prospective test of the effects of situation selection on emotional 
outcomes. Participants completed a questionnaire on a Friday that asked them to adopt the goal 
to select activities during the weekend that they believed would make them feel good, while 
avoiding doing things that they believed would make them feel bad. We then compared the 
emotional experiences of participants with the goal to engage in situation selection, with those of 
participants in a control condition who were not asked to use this strategy. As in Study 1, we 
predicted that situation selection would be a particularly effective strategy for individuals who 
are high in reactivity and were not competent at emotion regulation. 
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Methods 
Participants 
Using the average R2 value that we observed for the effect of situation selection on 
emotional outcomes in Study 1 (R2 = 0.26), an alpha level of .05 (two-tailed), 90% power to 
detect an effect, and 4 predictors in the linear multiple regression model, G*Power indicated that 
at least 49 participants would be required to detect an effect of similar magnitude. N = 129 
participants were recruited via Prolific Academic and paid $8.00 for taking part in a study with 
two parts. Four participants failed a check to ensure that they were paying attention4 and were 
excluded from subsequent analyses. Thus, the final sample included 125 participants. 
Participants were aged between 18 and 60 (M = 28.19, SD = 8.68) and were predominantly male 
(57.6%), identified themselves as white/Caucasian (70.4%), and held an undergraduate degree 
(56.0%). 
Procedure 
Baseline questionnaire. The first part of the study was completed on a Friday. 
Participants completed the same measures of use of situation selection (α = 0.71), reappraisal (α 
= 0.86), and suppression (α = 0.75) as in Study 1, along with the same measures of reactivity (α 
= 0.97) and competence at emotion regulation (α = 0.78). To investigate the extent to which 
participants responded in a socially desirable manner, participants also completed a shortened 
version of the Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (BIDR-6; Bobbio & Manganelli, 
2011). The BIDR-6 consists of 16 items measuring self-deception (e.g., I am a completely 
																																																								
4 Participants were asked to select a specific response to the statement I manage my emotions by playing tennis that 
was presented along with the statements comprising the Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (Gross & John, 2003). 
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rational person, 8 items, α = 0.77) and impression management (e.g., I sometimes tell lies if I 
have to, 8 items, α = 0.57).5 
Manipulation of situation selection. After completing the baseline questionnaire, 
participants were randomly assigned to a condition. Those in the experimental condition were 
asked to make an if-then plan (or ‘implementation intention’, Gollwitzer, 1999; Gollwitzer & 
Sheeran, 2006) for the upcoming weekend: If I am deciding what to do this weekend, then I will 
select activities that will make me feel good and avoid doing things that will make me feel bad! 
They were asked to repeat the plan to themselves three times and fully commit to carrying it out. 
Participants in the control condition were not asked to formulate a plan to consider how activities 
and situations might make them feel when deciding how to spend the weekend.6  
Follow-up questionnaire. Participants completed the second part of the study on the 
following Monday. As a check on our manipulation and to provide further evidence for the 
validity of our new measure of situation selection, participants started by completing the measure 
of situation selection developed in Study 1 – this time with respect to the weekend (e.g., During 
the weekend, I selected activities that helped me to feel good, α = 0.84). After this, participants 
indicated what they did over the weekend using an adaptation of the day reconstruction method 
(Kahneman, Kreuger, Schkade, Schwarz, & Stone, 2004). Participants were asked to think of 
each day as a continuous series of scenes or episodes and to provide a list of (up to ten) separate 
																																																								
5 The data for Study 2 come from a larger research project. Participants also completed the Difficulties in Emotion 
Regulation Scale (DERS) and self-assessment manikins for arousal. However, as the manipulation of situation 
selection used in Study 2 focused on the valence of emotional outcomes and our predictions concerned reactivity 
and competence at emotion regulation, these measures are not discussed further. As in Study 1, with the exception of 
the ERQ, the questions were presented in a random order, both within and between measures. 
6 Note that the instructions provided to participants in the experimental condition involved both (i) instructions to 
consider the affective impact of various activities and situations when deciding whether or not to engage in them and 
(ii) forming a plan to support this intention. Although such instructions essentially manipulate both goal and 
implementation intentions, given the oft-cited gap between (goal) intentions and action (e.g., Sheeran, 2002; Webb 
& Sheeran, 2006) our priority was to ensure that our manipulation of situation selection was as effective as possible. 
Future work might consider also having participants in the control condition form a comparable goal intention (i.e., 
to consider the effect of activities and situations on their emotions) in order to test the specific effect of if-then 
planning.	
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episodes on Saturday and Sunday. For each episode, participants indicated how they felt using a 
9-point scale depicting five self-assessment manikins ranging from happy to sad (Bradley & 
Lang, 1994). A measure of participants’ emotional experience over the weekend was computed 
by averaging ratings of emotions across the different episodes that they listed. 
Results 
Randomization Check 
MANOVA revealed no significant differences between the conditions in age, use of 
situation selection, reappraisal, suppression, reactivity, competence at emotion regulation, or on 
the self-deception or impression management subscales of socially desirable responding, F(8, 
113) = 0.86, p = .55, eta2 = .06. Thus, randomization was successful. 
Manipulation Check 
Next, we examined whether the intervention was successful at increasing situation 
selection for emotion regulation over the course of the weekend. As predicted, participants in the 
experimental condition were more likely to report having selected activities for the weekend that 
they believed would make them feel good while avoiding doing things that they believed would 
make them feel bad (M = 4.14, SD = 0.75) than were participants in the control condition (M = 
3.71, SD = 0.63), F(1, 123) = 11.97, p = .001, eta2 = .09.  
Impact of the Situation Selection Intervention on Affect Experienced During the Weekend 
Table 4 presents the descriptive statistics and correlations among the study variables. 
Similar to Study 1, emotional reactivity and perceived competence at emotion regulation were 
correlated with the use of reappraisal (rs = -0.30 and 0.44, respectively, ps < .001), but not the 
use of suppression (rs = -0.00 and 0.11, respectively) or situation selection (rs = -0.03 and 0.15, 
respectively). The self-deception subscale of the BIDR (but not the impression management 
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subscale) was significantly correlated with affect experienced over the weekend (r = 0.29, p < 
.001). We therefore controlled for self-deception in subsequent analyses.  
ANCOVA indicated that participants in the experimental condition experienced more 
positive affect over the weekend (M = 6.67, SD = 0.79) than did participants in the control 
condition (M = 6.17, SD = 0.75), F(1, 121) = 13.28, p < .001, eta2 = .10. Equivalent findings 
were observed without the covariate, F(1, 122) = 13.49, p < .001, eta2 = .10.  
Is Situation Selection Particularly Effective for Participants Who Are Reactive or Poor at 
Emotion Regulation? 
As in Study 1, reactivity and competence at regulating emotions were correlated (r = -
0.76, p < .001, see Table 4) but were treated as separate constructs in subsequent analyses. 
Hierarchical regression was used to test whether the effect of situation selection on affect 
experienced during the weekend was moderated by reactivity (see Table 5). The predictors were 
standardized prior to analysis and, as before, we controlled for levels of self-deception. The main 
effects of condition, reactivity, and self-deception on affect experienced over the weekend were 
statistically significant (betas = 0.27, -0.36, and 0.26, respectively, ps < .01). The interaction 
between condition and reactivity was marginally significant (beta = 0.20, p = .084). As in Study 
1, simple slopes (see Figure 3) indicated that for highly reactive participants (1SD above the 
mean), situation selection was associated with experiencing more positive affect (B = 0.33, p < 
.001). However, among less reactive participants (1SD below the mean), situation selection had 
no effect (B = 0.10, p = .251).  
The equivalent moderated regression analyses for competence at emotion regulation (see 
Table 6) revealed significant main effects of condition, competence at emotion regulation, and 
self-deception on affect experienced over the weekend (betas = 0.28, 0.45, and 0.20, 
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respectively, ps < .02). There was also a significant interaction between condition and 
competence at emotion regulation (beta = -0.25, p = .026). Again, as in Study 1, simple slopes 
(see Figure 4) indicated that, for participants who were not competent at emotion regulation 
(1SD below the mean), situation selection was associated with experienced affect (B = 0.36, p < 
.001). However, among participants who were competent at emotion regulation (1SD above the 
mean), situation selection had no effect (B = 0.08, p = .374). 
Discussion 
Study 2 provided an experimental test of the impact of situation selection on day-to-day 
affective outcomes in the field. The findings support those of Study 1 and point to a causal 
relationship between the use of situation selection and emotional experiences. Participants who 
formed the goal to select activities that they believed would make them feel good (and avoid 
those that they believed would make them feel bad) were more likely to report having done so 
than participants who were not given these instructions. Not only does this provide evidence that 
our manipulation was successful in prompting people to select situations, it also suggests that our 
new self-report measure is sensitive to changes in the use of the strategy, thus, starting to build 
evidence for the validity of the measure. Our findings also suggest that people are able to 
successfully employ situation selection when they are asked to do so. Critically, as in Study 1, 
situation selection was not only an effective strategy overall, but proved to be particularly 
effective for individuals who were emotionally reactive and / or who were not otherwise 
competent in regulating their emotions.  
General Discussion 
The present research demonstrated that situation selection is an effective strategy for 
regulating emotions, particularly among individuals who are reactive and / or who are poor at 
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emotion regulation. Using a new self-report measure of the use of situation selection, we found 
evidence that (a) people deliberately choose activities based on their emotional impact (average 
levels of situation selection in both studies were about 4 on a 5-point scale), (b) relatively simple 
instructions can be used to prompt people to engage in greater situation selection, (c) situation 
selection is effective at altering emotions, particularly reducing negative affect; and, critically, 
(d) situation selection is especially advantageous for those who most need help regulating their 
emotions. The finding that situation selection is particularly effective for those who are poor at 
regulating their emotions resonates with Rovenpor et al.’s (2013) observation that young people 
who lacked confidence in regulating their emotions were less likely to view negative material 
than their peers. 
Consistent with past research (Webb et al., 2012), we found that reappraisal and 
suppression have positive and negative effects on affective outcomes, respectively, regardless of 
peoples’ levels of reactivity and competence. We found some evidence that individuals who are 
highly reactive may use reappraisal less. However, our findings suggest that when they did use 
this strategy, it was as effective for them, as it was for less reactive participants. This finding 
suggests that there may be situational differences that drive highly reactive individuals’ use of 
reappraisal that would be interesting to explore in future research.  
Situation selection also proved advantageous for all participants, but our findings suggest 
that situation selection particularly benefits those who are reactive and / or who are not 
competent at dealing with their emotions as they arise. Reappraisal may be effective for people 
who are less reactive and / or competent at regulating their emotions because they can implement 
cognitive regulation strategies in a relatively effortless, automatic fashion (Niven et al., 2013; 
Williams, Bargh, Nocera, & Gray, 2009). However, situation selection provides an alternative 
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strategy for individuals that does not rely on in-the-moment cognitive resources, and allows 
reactive and / or less competent individuals to tune their environment in order to promote certain 
emotional outcomes.  
Limitations and Future Directions 
As with any new program of research, the present work has limitations that should be 
acknowledged. First, the two factors that we found moderated the impact of situation selection 
on emotional outcomes – namely, reactivity and competence at emotion regulation – were 
correlated (rs = -0.62 and -0.76 in Studies 1 and 2, respectively) suggesting that there is some 
overlap between the measures. Reactivity and competence are defined differently in that 
reactivity refers to the generation of emotions (e.g., how strongly do people react to emotional 
events?), while competence refers to peoples’ ability to regulate their emotions as and when they 
arise. However, despite the face validity of this distinction, there is debate over the extent to 
which the process of emotion generation can be distinguished from that of emotion regulation 
(e.g., Gross & Feldman Barrett, 2011) and the relatively high correlations between the measures 
of reactivity and competence in the present research suggest that people who are reactive are also 
likely to struggle to control their emotions. Whether being reactive is a determinant or 
consequence of difficulties regulating emotions is a question for future research – our findings 
simply suggest that both challenges can be addressed by selecting situations based on their likely 
affective impact.  
Another limitation is that we relied exclusively on measures of reactivity and did not 
measure other relevant constructs such as trait negative affect or neuroticism. We thus cannot 
speak to the extent that reactivity reflects other related constructs. However, other studies have 
considered the relationship between reactivity and trait levels of negative affect. For example, 
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Nock et al. (2009) found that reactivity was correlated with trait levels of negative affect among 
adolescents and young adults (r = 0.61 with depression, r = 0.53 with frustration, and r = 0.30 
with aggression) and also differed between participants with and without a mood disorder. It will 
therefore be important for future research investigating how reactivity influences the use and 
impact of situation selection to include measures of trait negative affect and neuroticism and to 
investigate whether only reactivity moderates the relations and, if so, why. 
Third, both of the studies reported here relied on self-report measures of situation 
selection, moderators (reactivity and competence), and outcome variables. We believe that this 
approach was justified for several reasons. First, developing a self-report measure of the use of 
situation selection was one of the primary aims of our research (although there are self-report 
measures of the use of other strategies for regulating emotions, to our knowledge there are 
currently no self-report measures of the extent to which people select situations based on their 
likely affective impact). Second, we employed self-report measures with established reliability 
and validity (e.g., Gross & John, 2003; Diener, et al., 1985; Niven et al., 2013; Nock et al., 2008; 
Warr et al., 1979; Watson et al., 1988; Zigmond & Snaith, 1983). Third, insofar as this was the 
first test of the role of situation selection, starting by examining the putative relations using self-
measures report seemed a reasonable first step in what is likely to become a longer research 
program. Nonetheless, future research might usefully investigate the reliability and validity of 
the new measure of situation selection in larger samples and in different contexts, as well as seek 
to manipulate variables such as emotional reactivity (e.g., by depriving participants of sleep, 
Rosales-Lagarde, Armony, del Rio-Portilla, Trejo-Martinez, Conde, & Corsi-Cabrera, 2012) and 
employ measures of outcomes that do not rely on self-reports (e.g., physiological measures of 
arousal, peer-reports) or retrospective recall (e.g., ecological momentary assessment, Shiffman, 
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Stone, & Hufford (2008). So doing would further allay concerns about retrospective reporting 
biases and demand effects (Orne, 1962). However, we would point out that our effects held even 
after controlling for self-deception and we did not always find effects that are consistent with 
peoples’ beliefs (e.g., evidence suggests that people believe that suppression is a useful emotion 
regulation technique, despite evidence that it causes objective increases in physiological 
responding and stress; Butler, Egloff, Wilhelm, Smith, Erickson, & Gross, 2003; Gross & 
Levenson, 1993). We similarly found that use of suppression was associated with adverse self-
reported emotional outcomes. 
The present findings also raise questions that should be considered in future research. For 
example, there are a number of different ways to select situations and experiences in order to 
shape emotional outcomes – people can approach situations that they believe will make them feel 
good (e.g., decide to go to a party) or avoid situations that they believe will make them feel bad 
(e.g., decide not to pick a fight with an aggrieved colleague). Furthermore, this can be achieved 
by striving to maintain the current situation (e.g., staying at a party because one is having a good 
time) or by leaving the situation (e.g., leaving a party to avoid a confrontation with said 
colleague, see Vujovic, Opitz, Birk, & Urry, 2014). It would be interesting to systematically 
manipulate these different strategies in future research and examine the outcomes of each.  
Similarly, it is currently unclear whether people select situations based on their short- or 
long-term affective impact. Classic dilemmas of self-control often require that people engage in 
aversive activities (e.g., painstakingly avoiding eating a desirable marshmallow) in order to 
achieve positive outcomes in the future (e.g., eating two marshmallows) (e.g., Mischel, 2015). 
Therefore, some people may select situations that they know will make them feel bad in the short 
term, because they anticipate that so doing will lead to positive feelings in the future. On the 
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other hand, people notoriously engage in short-term mood repair in the face of negative affect 
(Tice, Bratslavsky, & Baumeister, 2001), suggesting that at least some individuals are likely to 
focus on engaging in situations that make them feel good in the short term. Future research might 
thus examine how these different time horizons interact with the use of situation selection and 
how individual differences dictate which types of goals and situations people select.  
It would also be interesting to investigate whether individuals’ ability to forecast their 
future emotional states (Wilson & Gilbert, 2003; 2005) interacts with their use of situation 
selection. More broadly, it would be interesting to examine how conceptual knowledge about 
emotions and emotional situations (Lindquist & Barrett, 2008) and the ability to use that 
knowledge to plan behaviors, influences the success of efforts to regulate emotional experiences 
by selecting situations. There is little point in trying to regulate emotional experiences by, for 
example, avoiding a particular activity if, in fact, it might actually make one feel better. Physical 
activity is a good example; people (especially those who exercise relatively infrequently) tend to 
believe that physical activity will be unpleasant, when in fact they often feel better when they 
exercise (Loehr & Baldwin, 2014). Taken together with evidence that older adults are more 
likely to use situation selection because they are able to predict how they will feel in different 
situations (Scheibe et al., 2011; Nielsen, Knutson, & Carstensen, 2008), it seems likely that the 
ability to accurately predict emotional reactions to future events will influence both the 
likelihood of using situation selection to regulate emotions and the efficacy of using this strategy 
(Urry & Gross, 2010). It is also possible that people who are reactive may be better at predicting 
how they will feel when compared to people who are less reactive (although to our knowledge 
this hypothesis has not yet been investigated). If so, then this may go some way toward 
explaining why people who are emotionally reactive seem to particularly benefit from situation 
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selection. Future studies might investigate these ideas by measuring skill at affective forecasting 
(e.g., Dunn, Brackett, Ashton-Jones, Schneiderman, & Salovey, 2007). 
Finally, as situation selection is only adaptive when used flexibly, it will be interesting in 
future research to examine which sorts of situation selection are adaptive and which are not. 
Aldao and Christensen (2015) recently described a ‘three-level model of emotion regulation’ that 
might be a useful framework for evaluating the extent to which different forms of situation 
selection are adaptive. The model suggests that affective outcomes (i.e., whether one feels good 
or bad) only represent the first, and proximal, level of outcomes. In order to determine whether 
the resultant affect (e.g., feeling angry) is adaptive or not, one needs to also consider the 
behaviours that are motivated by such affect and the outcomes of these behaviours; where the 
latter likely depends on a myriad of contextual factors and individual differences. For example, 
deciding to confront someone and feeling angry as a result may be adaptive in some contexts 
(e.g., the person who is confronted becomes aware of how important the issue is), but less 
adaptive in other contexts (e.g., for people who then struggle not to translate feelings of anger 
into aggression, or when the expression of such feelings prompts the person who is confronted to 
be aggressive).  
Conclusion 
In conclusion, the present research offers new correlational and experimental evidence 
concerning the use of situation selection as a strategy for regulating emotions. We observed that 
situation selection leads to improved emotional outcomes, and is particularly effective in 
improving emotional outcomes among people who struggle to regulate their emotions effectively 
(emotionally reactive people, individuals who see themselves as less competent at managing 
their feelings). Notwithstanding the limitations of the studies reported here, the present research 
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underlines the potential for using situation selection to successfully navigate emotional life and 
suggests several directions for future studies on this relatively under-researched emotion 
regulation strategy.  
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations between Variables (Study 1) 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1. Use of situation selection 
2. Use of reappraisal 0.37
***
 
3. Use of suppression -0.05 0.01 


















































































































13. Gender 0.09 -0.01 -0.26
***
 0.02 0.03 -0.04 -0.10 -0.05 0.05 0.12
*
 -0.08 0.09 
Mean 3.91 4.96 3.71 20.74 2.01 30.06 16.22 5.43 7.98 33.68 4.86 36.22 
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SD 0.67 1.11 1.39 7.74 0.64 9.33 7.31 4.24 4.41 19.87 1.35 12.63 
Note. ER = Emotion regulation, SD = Standard deviation. 
*
 p < .05, 
**
 p < .01, 
***
 p < .001. Gender is coded 1 = male and 2 = female. 
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Table 2 
Regression of Emotional Outcomes on the use of Emotion Regulation Strategies, Reactivity, and Interactions (Study 1) 
Variable SWL Happiness Positive affect Negative affect Depression Anxiety 

















































Reappraisal x Reactivity -0.04 -0.09 0.00 0.02 -0.02 -0.03 



















Note. SWL = Subjective well-being. Beta weights are from the final step of the analysis. 
*
 p < .05, 
**
 p < .01, 
***
 p < .001 
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Table 3 
Regression of Emotional Outcomes on the use of Emotion Regulation Strategies, Competence at Emotion Regulation, and Interactions 
(Study 1) 
 
Variable SWL Happiness Positive affect Negative affect Depression Anxiety 
Use of situation selection (SS) 0.04 0.00 0.00 -0.08 -0.09 0.11
*
 










































Reappraisal x Competence 0.03 0.10 0.06 -0.04 -0.02 0.05 
Suppression x Competence -0.09 -0.02 0.00 -0.11
*
 -0.09 -0.04 
R
2














Note. SWL = Subjective well-being. Beta weights are from the final step of the analysis. 
*
 p < .05, 
**
 p < .01, 
***
 p < .001 
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Table 4 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations between Variables (Study 2) 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Baseline 
1. Use of situation selection 
2. Use of reappraisal 0.38
***
 
3. Use of suppression -0.01 0.14 
4. Reactivity -0.03 -0.30
**
 -0.00 









 0.10 -0.17 0.35
***
 
7. Impression management 0.17 0.08 -0.04 0.04 0.05 0.12 
8. Age -0.03 0.05 -0.02 -0.04 -0.06 -0.03 -0.17 






 -0.06 -0.13 0.18* 
Follow-up 










 0.10 -0.07 0.14 








 -0.12 -0.09 -0.05 0.39
***
 
Mean 3.94 4.94 4.15 37.90 4.61 4.55 3.90 28.19  3.92 6.42 
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SD 0.57 0.98 1.22 20.77 1.17 0.95 1.05 8.68  0.73 0.80 
Note. ER = Emotion regulation. SD = Standard deviation. 
*
 p < .05, 
**
 p < .01, 
***
 p < .001. Gender is coded 1 = male and 2 = female. 
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Table 5 
Regression of Affect Experienced During the Weekend on Situation Selection (Condition), 




















Note. Beta weights are from the final step of the analysis.  
a
 p <.10 
*
 p < .05, 
**
 p < .01, 
***
 p < .001  
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Table 6 
Regression of Affect Experienced During the Weekend on Situation Selection (Condition), 




















Note. Beta weights are from the final step of the analysis.  
*
 p < .05, 
**
 p < .01, 
***
 p < .001  
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Figure 1 
Simple Slopes for the Interaction between the Use of Situation Selection and Reactivity on 
Subjective Well-being (Panel A), Happiness (Panel B), Negative Affect (Panel C), Depression 
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Note. These figures were drawn using the spreadsheets provided by Dawson 
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Figure 2 
Simple Slopes for the Interaction between the Use of Situation Selection and Competence at 
Emotion Regulation on Subjective Well-being (Panel A), Happiness (Panel B), Negative Affect 

















































Running head: SITUATION SELECTION 53 
 
 
Note. These figures were drawn using the spreadsheets provided by Dawson 
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Figure 3 
Simple Slopes for the Interaction between Situation Selection (Condition) and Reactivity on 
Affect Experienced During the Weekend (Study 2) 
 
Note. This figures was drawn using the spreadsheets provided by Dawson 
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Figure 4 
Simple Slopes for the Interaction between Situation Selection (Condition) and Competence at 
Emotion Regulation on Affect Experienced During the Weekend (Study 2) 
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